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An interpretation of the statutory term 
"worker": a reply to Geare 
Isaacus K. Adzoxornu• 
1. Introduction 
Under notnaal circumstances, I would have allowed Geare (1991) to indulge himself 
in the erroneous view that the interpretation of the tetna "worker" in the Labour Relations 
Act 1987 is confined to the common law "·employee". lt is necessary howev~er, to come 
out to defend my original thesis (Adzoxomu, 1990) that the tetna need not be so narrowly 
construed. G~eare seeks to demonstrate, without the relevant historical or policy 
considerations, and more importantly, without the relevant canons of statutory 
construction, that his counter thesis is "in fact clearly superior" to mine (p.193). It is 
clear from the Geare's comm~ent that he considers modern New Zealand industrial 
legislation to have preserved the master and servant relationship. The purpose of this 
reply is to reassert my original thesis that the definition of "worker" in the Labour 
Relations Act is liberal enough to cover an independent contractor and to demonstrate that 
the counter thesis of Geare is too conservativ~e to meet the requirements of modern 
industrial relations. I shall achieve this purpose by addressing Geare's counter thesis 
under his own subheadings. 
2. Parl.iamentary intent 
~Geare's frrst argument is that in popular usage, "worker" and "employee" are regarded 
as "largely" synonymous (p.194). The fact that he chooses to use the word "largely" 
m~eans that he recognizes that there is in ev~en popular usage., a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the 2 terms are synonymous. This is not all. It is also necessary to point out 
that we are here, not dealing with the popular usage of the tenns. We are instead dealing 
with the statutory definitions of the tenus. The popular usag~e of the tettns have ceased to 
apply because Parliament has considered it necessary to redefine the tet n1s. There is, 
therefore, no point in giving ·the tenns their popular meanings. 
~Geare then challenges my observation that P.arliament possesses sufficient 
sophistication to differ~entiate the one from the other tenn (p.l94). In so doing, he refers 
to the introduction in 1970 of the personal grievance procedure and claims that the 
amendment of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 intended "wrongful" 
to mean "unjustifiable" dismissal, but because Parliament was not sufficiently 
sophisticated, it enacted the fottner instead of the latter te1u1. There are at least 2 serious 
flaws in the ·Geare's example. First, the tertn "wrongful" was not defined in the amending 
legislation (Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act sl79(l)). It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to rely on the undefined concept of "wrongful" dismissal to make the point 
that Parliament did not know what it was doing . We are fortunate enough to have in the 
Labour Relations Act and other enacunents the ~contrasting definitions of "'worker" and 
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"employee" from which we can deteiRlbte 
did not exist under the 1970 amendment. 
The second Oaw in the pic 
the Minister who introduced the amending 
provide only a "procedure" for handling 
procedure a panacea to ~e nuDlerous 
dismissals. When questioned furthez whother dle 
concept of wrongful dismis.ul, the Minister was 
said, was aimed at: 
wrongful dismissal - that is, a dismissal that ia not 
clearly understood by the parties. H we added lhe wOJdl "ttr 
open up the whole range of dismissals, whether they 
certainly not the intention to do that (NZ ~,. .... 
1970: p 4072). 
..... 
Vel 
I felt some initial hesitation to be the one to point out this hlsto1lca1 ~ ia 
Geare's argument. However, I considered it necessary in order to show dull oa 
occasions our elected representatives know what they are doing. We may 
agree with them, but that is not the issue here. 
Geare's next argument is that I am incoiiCCt in observing that Parliament ~ 18 
confine "employee" to a person who works under a contract of service. He ' M 
definition of "employee" in the Equal Pay Act 1972 which I quoted in part Bvea 
suppose I was incoiiect in this conclusion, the observation only advances a 81 apG fl my 
thesis that statutory defmitions sometimes change the meaning of common Jaw 
I am, therefore, grateful to Geare for pointing out that the definition of "employee• ill. ta. 
Equal Pay Act 1972 envisages more than the coiDIIlon law contmct of service. 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 defines "employee" with Ill same wor48 ltl 
those chosen by the Labour Relations Act to define "wmker". However, lhe samo Att ia 
repealing and substituting section 2(1) of the Parental Leave and Employment Plu18Cdoa 
Act 1987 defines "employee" as: "any person of any age employed by an eanployer to do 
any work for hire or reward, but does not include an independent • 
This provision vindicates my thesis in relation to the meaning of •wo1br• in the La11our 
Relations Act. It is important to understand that statutory definitions do aot I10CCIM ity 
preserve traditional values. Statutory definitions, more often than not, lR "less 
with the expression of values than with the realization of practicalaoals ilL 
utilitarian te1n1s and pursued according to canons of scientific • (Abel. 1973, 
p.186). 
3. Industrial tribunals 
The purpose of my thesis is to challenge the inte1pretation which lnbuuals 
have placed on the term "worker" so Geare's arguments about my stance under Ibis 
heading do not, therefore, raise any issues that need replying to. 
4. Role of Unions 
I still maintain that it is not the province of the Labour Court to mate or UIIRialla a 
worker for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act. I still consider the to 
belong to unions. My inte1pretation of "workez" is intended to achieve 
Act. The Act cannot intend in one section to restrict its protections to Jbe 
employee and proceed in the provisions which create to the 
protections, to recognize also categories outside the common law employee, 
. 
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at p.73 of my article, sections 58(a) and 60 of the Act recognize "all persons working" 
and "every person who by virtue of that person's work or intended work", respectively, as 
having a right to join unions as the only means to the enjoyment of the protections of 
the Act. 
Geare does not show anywhere in his comment that I have interpreted the union 
membership provisions of the Act incorrectly. He cannot do this because he is aware that 
no eligibility qualification, apart from the requirement that a person should be working or 
should intend to work, have been imposed under the Act on potential trade union 
members. Unless he can construe "work" or "working" to mean work or working under a 
contract of service, he will not have any case. 
Geare is also aware of the unfettered discretion conferred on unions to fotinulate their 
own membership ·clauses. As a result he does not challenge my interpretation of this 
discretion. Instead of so doing, he reacts back to the definition of "worker" and observes 
that it is not defined as "any one covered by a union's membership clause" (p.195). 
Obvious again is the desperate effort to fedeem the employee who, for all these years has 
sold his or her birthright to the statutory worker. 
S. Interpretation 
There are serious credibility gaps in Geare's exercise in statutory interpretation. 
According to Geare, "the fact [the definition of 'worker'] refers to a person being 
'employed' is suggestive of a contract of service only, given that popular usage refers to 
'engaging' a contractor ... " (p.195-196). The CoUins Eng.lish Dictionary (1985) defines 
"employ" as "to ~engage or make use of the ,services of (a person) in return for money; 
hire; to provide work or occupation for; keep busy; occupy". The same source defines 
"engage" as "to secure the services of; employ". The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) 
also defines "e.mployee" as: "use services of (person); keep (person) in one's service; 
busy, keep occupied .... " The latter source also defines "engage" as: "bind by contract ... ; 
hifie (servant, employee)". ·Ther~e does not appear to be any difference in the ordinary 
meanings of the 2 te1n1s. It is, therefore., suggested that ~Gcafe is not correct in his 
observation that one cannot "employ" an independent contractor. An independent 
contractor may be "employed" or "'engaged" as much .as the common law ~employee under 
section 2 of the Labour Relations Act. Clear words will be necessary to exclude an 
independent contractor from being "employed" for hire or reward. 
Geare also seeks to preserve his narrow definition of "worker" by an appeal to the 
exclus.io unius est exclusio alterius rule of statutory construction (p.196). The 
authorities will, however, indicate that the attempts here are, if anything, an abuse of this 
residual rule of construction. The Labour Relations .Act defines worker to ... include" a 
homeworker. The ordinary understanding, whenever "include" is used is that the 
categories which follow ar~e only examples of what is intended or envisaged 
(Maxwe/1,1969, p.270-271). 
One might wish to contrast the Chanc,ery Tavern Ltd easel with Thorby.2 In the 
former, Palmer J made an order for the "limited reinstatement" of a worker-grievant 
apparently on the basis that section 227(a) of the Labour Relations Act confers 
jurisdiction on the Court by virtue of the word "including", to create other fauns of 
reinstatem~ent beside those expressly mentioned in the subsection. In the latter case, 
how,ever, the Arbitration Court considered that there was no scope in section 117(7) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973 for a grievance committee to order a worker's 
reinstatement to a position which involved less hours of work. This was so because the 
latter subsection expressly mentioned only 2 forms of reinstatement 
1 [1988) N.ZILR 1465. 
2 [1981] ACJ 199 . 
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It will make no difference whether the word "include", "including" or "includes" is 
used in the interpretation provision of an Act. As I .angan (1969, p.270) observes: 
[T]he word "include" is used "in order to enlarge the meaning of words or 
phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words 
or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they 
signify according to their natural impor~ but also those things which the 
interpretation clause declares that they should include". In other words, the 
word in respect of which "includes" is used bears both its extended statutory 
meaning and "its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be 
properly applicable. 
Geare might wish to reconsider his argument in this context. 
6. Conclusion 
It will now be obvious that Geare has no solid contribution to make to the debate 
whether "worker" in the Labour Relations Act means only a person who works under a 
contract of service or whether it means also a person who works under a conttact for 
services. I still maintain that Parliament has made its intention explicit enough that 
"worker" is not necessarily confined to the common law employee. The argument that I 
am incorrect to so assert because Parliament has not changed the definition of "worker" 
. for nearly 100 years, may be countered in 2 ways. The frrst is that, so far, the claims 
before our industrial tribunals have not been whether the definition of worker can be 
extended to also an independent contractor. All the claims have been whether a person 
works or worked under a contract of service. One must admit that claimants themselves 
have not directed their attention to the liberal definition of the tetnl. The second is that 
academic writers such as Geare (1988, p.65-66) have failed to point out that the defmition 
is liberal enough to cover the independent contractor. One cannot explain this failure in 
any real tetins; however, it has succeeded in misleading everybody including judges of 
industrial tribunals. Put together, these 2 reasons would explain why Parliament has 
never had the opportunity to review the application of the defmition to actual industrial 
relations practice. 
It is, however, necessary to point out that this parliamentary inertia cannot serve as 
an Ark of Israel for Geare's counter thesis. The fact that a particular law has not been 
changed for 2,000 years is no concrete proof that the law has been applied correctly for all 
those years. 
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